

Wireless and Mobile Softwarization Security and Privacy Pandora's Box?

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CAE Tech Talk

Northeastern University Cybersecurity and Privacy Institute


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OUTLINE


- Wireless pervasiveness
- A spectrum of attacks in wireless and mobile systems
- Towards security and privacy in wireless and mobile systems

SECURITY CYCLE


- Model with assumptions, proof?
- "Attacker" escapes the model
 - and demonstrates feasibility of attacks
- Ideally a fix that accounts of potential future attacks
- Is this a stable control loop in wireless and mobile systems?




SOFTWARE SECURITY: DATA BREACHES 2006 - 2008



SOFTWARE SECURITY: DATA BREACHES 2009 - 2011





THE CASE OF PASSWORD LEAKS

	152,445,165	Adobe accounts
	30,811,934	Ashley Madison accounts 👱
æ	13,545,468	000webhost accounts
ୢୄ୵	13,186,088	R2Games accounts
ganigo	8,243,604	Gamigo accounts
HEROES NEWERTH	8,089,103	Heroes of Newerth accounts
1	5,915,013	Nexus Mods accounts
vtech	4,833,678	VTech accounts
@mail.ru	4,821,262	mail.ru Dump accounts
8	4,789,599	Bitcoin Security Forum Gmail Dump accounts
2	4,609,615	Snapchat accounts
	4,483,605	Money Bookers accounts
<u>Advit</u> friendfinder	3,867,997	Adult Friend Finder accounts <u>è</u>

NETELLER	3,619,948	Neteller accounts
Спрашивай	3,474,763	Спрашивай.py accounts
MPGH	3,122,898	MPGH accounts
XSplit	2,983,472	XSplit accounts
`	2,460,787	iPmart accounts
P	2,330,382	Patreon accounts
(Differencies) Concise	1,580,933	Dungeons & Dragons Online accounts
NIML	1,535,473	Nival accounts
KM.RU	1,476,783	KM.RU accounts
YOUPORN	1,327,567	YouPorn accounts 👱
G	1,247,574	Gawker accounts
ERMERZ PLAKET	1,217,166	Gamerzplanet accounts
NGU	1,194,597	NextGenUpdate accounts
Yandex	1,186,564	Yandex Dump accounts
Lords Range	1,141,278	Lord of the Rings Online
		accounts

ADOBE BREACH

4464- -xxx@yahoo.com- -g2B6PhWEH366cdBSCql/UQ==- -try: qwerty123	4464 O User ID yahoo.com- -g2B6PhWEH36 O Password hint try: qwerty123
4465- -xxxxx@jcom.home.ne.jp- -Eh5tLomK+N+82csoVwU9bw==- -?????	4465- -xxxxx@jcom.home.ne.jp- -Eh5tLomK+N+82csoVwU9bw==- -?????
4466- -xx@hotmail.com- -ahw2b2BELzgRTWYvQGn+kw==- -quiero a	4466- -xx@hotmail.com- -ahw2b2BELzgRTWYvQGn+kw==- -quiero a
4467- -xxx@yahoo.com- -leMTcMPEPcjioxG6CatHBw==- -	4467-
4468- -username- -xxxxx@adobe.com- -2GtbVrmsERzioxG6CatHBw==- -	4468- username @ Username pe.com-l-2GtbVrmsERzioxG6CatHBw==-l-
4469- -xxxxx@yahoo.com- -4LSlo772tH4=- -rugby	4469
4470- -xxx@hotmail.com- -WXGzX56zRXnioxG6CatHBw==- -	4470
4471- -xxxx@yahoo.com- -x3eI/bgfUNrioxG6CatHBw==- -myspace	4471- -xxxx@yahoo.com ③ Email address xG6CatHBw==- -myspace
4471- -xxx@hotmail.com- -kbyi9I8wDrrioxG6CatHBw==- -regular	4471- -xxx@hotmail.com- -kbyi918wDrrioxG6CatHBw==- -regular

- Passwords encrypted with 64 bits in ECB (3DES)
 - Not salted
 - Not CBC
 - Not AES


Adobe password data	Password hint		
110edf2294fb8bf4	-> numbers 123456		
110edf2294fb8bf4	-> ==123456		
110edf2294fb8bf4	-> c'est "123456"		
8fda7e1f0b56593f e2a311ba09ab4707	-> numbers		
8fda7e1f0b56593f e2a311ba09ab4707	-> 1-8 @ 12345678		
8fda7e1f0b56593f e2a311ba09ab4707	-> 8digit		
2fca9b003de39778 e2a311ba09ab4707	-> the password is password		
2fca9b003de39778 e2a311ba09ab4707	-> password ③ password		
2fca9b003de39778 e2a311ba09ab4707	-> rhymes with assword		
e5d8efed9088db0b	-> q w e r t y		
e5d8efed9088db0b	-> ytrewq tagurpidi 3 qwerty		
e5d8efed9088db0b	-> 6 long qwert		
ecba98cca55eabc2	-> sixxone		
ecba98cca55eabc2	-> 1*6		
ecba98cca55eabc2	-> sixones		

Src. Naked Security


ECB VS. CBC ENCRYPTION MODES



Plaintext



ECB Mode Encryption



CBC Mode Encryption

\$ COST OF CRACKING A PASSWORD (2009)

KDF	6 letters	8 letters	8 chars	10 chars	40-char text	80-char text
DES CRYPT	< \$1	< \$1	< \$1	< \$1	< \$1	< \$1
MD5	< \$1	< \$1	< \$1	\$1.1k	\$1	1.5T
MD5 CRYPT	< \$1	< \$1	\$130	\$1.1M	\$1.4k	1.5×10^{15}
PBKDF2 (100 ms)	< \$1	< \$1	\$18k	\$160M	\$200k	2.2×10^{17}
bcrypt (95 ms)	< \$1	\$4	\$130k	\$1.2B	1.5M	\$48B
scrypt (64 ms)	< \$1	\$150	4.8M	\$43B	\$52M	6×10^{19}
PBKDF2 (5.0 s)	< \$1	\$29	\$920k	\$8.3B	\$10M	$$11 \times 10^{18}$
bcrypt (3.0 s)	< \$1	\$130	4.3M	\$39B	\$47M	\$1.5T
scrypt $(3.8 s)$	\$900	\$610k	\$19B	\$175T	\$210B	2.3×10^{23}

TABLE 1. Estimated cost of hardware to crack a password in 1 year.

[Percival 2009]

Only includes cryptographic hardware cost Letters are 26 alphabet letters in lowercase

DISRUPTION EXAMPLES: ENTER CRYPTOCURRENCIES

- Developments
 - scrypt is used as proof-of-work in cryptocurrencies (e.g., Litecoin)
 - ASICs achieve > 10¹⁰ SHA256 Hash / second



S9j-14.5 TH/s with PSU

Shipping: Sep. 21-30

446 USD					
Weight	8 kg				
Quantity	_	1	+		

ARE WE TOO OPTIMISTIC?

• Even the wealthiest computer technology companies are not careful!




21 Facebook Stored Hundreds of Millions of User Passwords in Plain Text for Years


WHY? OBSERVATIONS

- Lagging behind
 - Under-estimating attacks
 - Inertia: systems designed and deployed years ago
 - Security mechanisms are not user friendly
 - Increasing rate of attacks
 - Span both foundations, design, and implementation
 - TLS/SSL, WPS, cars, implantable devices, CPS (ADS-B, Water Control System, ILS)
- Incentives
 - Monetization
 - Cyberwarfare, terrorism, industrial espionage
- New attack-enabling technologies
 - Abuse of privacy infrastructure: Tor, Bitcoins
 - Connectivity
 - Open source software/hardware are exposing the limitations of security through obscurity and fundamental design flaws
 - Access to cryptography
 - Policies: BYOD
- Issues exacerbated in wireless and mobile

WIRELESS IS UBIQUITOUS

- Beyond mobile devices (cellular, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth)
 - GPS assist in air traffic
 - Transportation systems
 - Smart grid (power plants sync, smart meters)
 - Implantable devices
- It's security and robustness are critical for a variety of applications





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WIRELESS IS UBIQUITOUS

- Beyond mobile devices (cellular, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth)
- It is also used in harmful applications







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WIRELESS SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS

- Unique characteristics with fundamental constraints:
 - Broadcast medium
 - RF spectrum
 - Energy



 Limited resources led to complex designs and systems but also weaknesses

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ASSUMPTIONS IN WIRELESS & MOBILE SYSTEMS

- Wireless systems are complex
- Attacks are impractical e.g., adversary has to be local
- Adversary needs to operate over a wide spectrum
- Adversary needs to operate in real time
- Why would someone do this?
- Adversary will not dare and will be caught

WIRELESS THREATS TO RESILIENCY

- Past: large easily detectable jammers
- Today: commodity on ebay!
 - Low-cost, small form factor, mobile
 - Repurposed microwave cavity magnetron: \$7
 - Youtube DIY videos
 - Proliferation of SDR e.g., HackRF, BladeRF, LimeSDR, XTRX
 - Smart phone as SDRs
 - Broadcom Wi-Fi SoC w/ TLV vulnerability [Beniamini 2017]
- Smart energy-efficient cyber-mines
 - Hard to detect, target control mechanisms
 - Combined with malware
- Softwarization of wireless systems including hardware
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




marisoft **lte**



OP



BEYOND INTEREST TO MILITARY APPLICATIONS


- Starting point for attacks on privacy: rogue infrastructure
 - Smart-jam & downgrade a cellular network to 2G one-way auth
 - Smart-jam & carry MITM attack against WPA-Enterprise
- Many unencrypted protocols with many possibilities for exploitation
 - Public safety P25 [Clark et al. 2011]
 - Aviation ADS-B broadcast [Strohmeier et al. 2018]
 - Instrument Landing System (ILS) [Sathaye et al. 2019]





CELLULAR WIRELESS COMMUNICATION

- Illustration with GSM system:
 - FDMA:
 - Carrier channels of 200KHz
 - Very few Beacon Frequencies
 - TDMA:
 - 8 time slots
 - TSO: carries most control traffic
 - Super Frame Structure:
 - Critical information such as FCCH, SCH, BCCH1 is only scheduled 1/51 frames
 - \Rightarrow 1 pulse every 400 timeslots on a 200KHz band (out of many bands) prevents all communication
- CDMA, OFDM have similar weaknesses (WiMax, LTE):
 - Pilots, beacons
 - LTE control information is within 1MHz (out of possibly 20MHz)




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CELLULAR WIRELESS COMMUNICATION


- Attack steps
 - Stealthy & localized 4G/3G/2G jamming
 - Downgrade to 2G rogue BTS
 - Identify targets: IMSI
 - Insert: SMS, Tweets
- 2014: 19 fake BTS detected; [Li et al. 2017]: many more!
 - Rudimentary techniques






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JAMMING DATA PACKETS



APPLICATION TO IEEE802.11AG

- 48 OFDM data sub-carriers with predictable interleaving
 - Jam 7 out of 48; Jam 1-2 OFDM symbols
 - 3 orders of magnitude weaker jamming signal [Vo-Huu et al. 2016]



Can be combined with smart attacks on RAA

• Stealthy, up to 5 orders of magnitude lower energy cost


IEEE802.11 AUTO-RATE ATTACKS

- Observation
 - 2 links with 54Mbps
 - Each link has a throughput of 17.74 Mbps
 - Total throughput: 35.48 Mbps
 - 1 link with 54M, the other with 1Mbps
 - 54M link: 0.95 Mbps
 - 1M link: 0.94 Mbps
 - Total throughput: 1.89 Mbps

Mbps


- Attack [Noubir et al. 2011]
 - Adversary targets weakest link
 - Existing auto-rate protocols easy to keep a node at low-rate,
 - Results in increase of collision probability, some auto-rate protocols exhibit congestion collapse behavior

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GLOBAL CONGESTION ATTACKS ON WI-FI NETWORKS VIA INTERFERENCE COUPLING

- Congestion that propagates in time and space [Xin et al. 2017]
 - Existence of phase transition behavior
 - Enables remote attacks



WPA-ENTERPRISE ATTACK

Targeted & Stealthy credentials capture [Cassola et al. 2013] Attacker Victim MAC Address RADIUS + RADIUS + Cert' Cert Long range 400m Networ SDR + Victim AP, SSID Directional 3. Jammed Antenna Several low level details 1. Probe Request 2. Probe Response, SSID Overcome OS protections ProbeResponse 4. Probe Response 5. Association, TLS 6. Authentication Data Probe Response (Jam) Probe Response Rise of Wi-Fi targeted attacks **Probe Request** Darkhotel APT through Wi-Fi (mostly Asia) $t_0 + T_C$ time t_d T_T Targets included CEOs, senior vice presidents, sales and marketing directors and top R&D staff

REMOTE SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS

- Many powerful side-channel attacks assume physical access to the device
- Screaming channels work shows this assumption to be invalid [Camurati et al. 2018]
- Locally compromised device enables remote sidechannel attacks
 - Tools like nexmon





Figure 1: Labeled die picture from an nRF51822 Bluetooth LE 2.4GHz mixed-signal design chip. Digital and Analog parts of the chip can be easily distinguished (Original picture CC BY 3.0 by zeptobars [56]). This chip is very similar to the chip we use in our experiments.




CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS


- Power grid [Shepard et al. 2012]
 - GPS spoofing results in desynchronized PMUs
 - Desynchronized measurements lead to incorrect assessment of electric generators stability
 - E.g., 10 degree difference automatically trips the generators
 - Tripping a single generator can result in a cascade of failures [2003 Blackout]
- Aviation ADS-B (mandated by 2020)
 - Location inference
 - Ghost aircraft disturbance
 - Privacy breaches: M&A, states relations [Strohmeier et al. 2018]



CPS: AIRCRAFT LANDING SYSTEMS

- **Marker beacon:** allow pilots to accurately guage their distance from runway (on off keying, 75 MHz
- **Localizer:** used to correctly center an aircraft during landing (two yagi antennas, transmitting a code continuously at 108.1 and 111.95 MHz)





CPS: ILS

[Sathaye et al. 2019]

ars TECHNICA

BIZ & IT TECH SCIENCE POLICY CARS GAMING & CULTURE STORE FORUMS

HACKING LANDING SYSTEMS -

The radio navigation planes use to land safely is insecure and can be hacked

Radios that sell for \$600 can spoof signals planes use to find runways.

DAN GOODIN - 5/15/2019, 6:00 AM





PRIVACY: TRACKING AND BEYOND

Wireless and mobile systems are riddled with opportunities for attackers

Softwarization is decreasing the cost


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ATTACK ON APPLE WIRELESS DIRECT LINK (AWDL)

- Apple Wireless Direct Link (AWDL) based on Wi-Fi ad hoc mode AWDL is widely used (over billion iOS, macOS, tvOS, watchOS devices) Device-to-device services e.g., Apple AirDrop, and by Apple Watch & TV Services rely on a combination of AWDL and Bluetooth LE neo:Desktop demo\$ sudo ./mowl -i en0 -a crash -t Janes-iPhone 11:20:21 INFO : WLAN device: en0 Design and implementation flaws [Stute et al. 2019] 11:20:21 INFO : Host device: tap0 Attacks without connecting to the same network Expose users' long-term information Real MAC address, device owner names, etc Enables efficient tracking Denial of service attack Targeted crashing Simultaneously crash (blackout) Man-in-the-middle AirDrop file transfers, intercept and modify Disclosed to Apple, released fix to DoS [November 2
- Beyond Apple ecosystem: Wi-Fi Neighbor Awareness Networking (NAN), Google Android NAN

FINGERPRINTING WIRELESS RADIOS


- Wi-Fi radio fingerprinting [Vo-Huu et al. 2017]
 - RF Techniques: ramp-up/down, CFO/SFO,
 - Wi-Fi specific: scrambling seed
 - Machine learning + heuristics
- Evaluated in the wild on 100 Wi-Fi interfaces
 - 65% to uniquely identify a device
 - 93% to distinguish between 5 interfaces
- Fingerprinting & localization of cellular radio interfaces



LTE LOCALIZATION/FINGERPRINTING

- Unencrypted control channels
 - Devices unique & temporary identifiers
 - IMSI, TMSI, RNTI
 - Complete access to scheduling information
 - Quantity and location of assigned resources in uplink and downlink
- Can long-term identify & localize a user?
- Tracking and fingerprinting
 - Radio & Identifiers
 - But also the set of apps

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REVISING THE MODELS: ADVERSARY

- Softwarization enables
 - Flexibility in wireless systems e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Cellular
 - Standards are available as open source software
- Adversary can
 - Decode, encode, mimick any protocols
 - Operate on a wide spectrum in real time
 - Sense and intercept RF emissions anywhere including being local
- Adversary wants
 - Intercept, block, infer (location, traffic), deceive (drain, jujitsu)
- Adversary will (intentional or unintentional)
 - Jam (GPS case 2013)
 - Fake BTS

Truck driver has GPS jammer, accidentally jams Newark airport

An engineering firm worker in New Jersey has a GPS jammer so his bosses don't know where he is all the time. However, his route takes

REVISING THE MODELS: COMP. & COMMS


- Softwarization enables advanced techniques: flexibility, agility, robustness
 - Information/communications theory, game theory, machine learning
- Software security for wireless systems
 - Trusted Execution Environments for RF

CURRENT STATE OF WIRELESS SYSTEMS

- Today's wireless networks are brittle with complex control mechanisms
 - prone to cross-layer attacks and amplification effects
- Wireless permeates the cyber and physical worlds
 - increasingly connecting legacy and new systems
- Attacks on wireless links have implications on the overall system
 targeted and stealthy
- Unlike in software, many wireless attacks are not fixed
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HOW ABOUT MOBILE SYSTEMS?

HOW MALICIOUS CAN A FLASHLIGHT APP BE?



FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges Against Flashlight App Creator

https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2014/04/ftcapproves-final-order-settlingcharges-against-flashlight-app



Brightest Flashlight Free ®

GoldenShores Technologies, LLC

Version 2.4.2 can access:

Location

- approximate location (network-based)
- precise location (GPS and network-based)

Photos/Media/Files

· modify or delete the contents of your USB storage

Free

read the contents of your USB storage

🛠 Camera

take pictures and videos

Device ID & call information

read phone status and identity

? Other

- disable or modify status bar
- read Home settings and shortcuts
- control flashlight
- prevent device from sleeping
 view network connections
- view network connecti
 full network access
- TUII network acce
 install shortcuts
- uninstall shortcuts

IN 2019

1.339.298 total


Privacy Policy

Below is a summary of the Brightest Flashlight® privacy ull privacy policy is contained within the ishlight Free® EULA (End-User License , which is reproduced below. In the case where y and the EULA disagree, the EULA is the ocument.

Privacy Policy Summary:

1. COLLECTION & TRANSMISSION OF GEOLOCATION INFORMATION. Goldenshores Technologies and its subsidiaries and agents may collect your geolocation based information and transmit that information to third-party service providers. Geolocation includes data regarding your device's geolocation, including but not limited to GPS-based, WiFi-based, or cell-based location information. The specific category of persons or entities referred to as "third-party service provider" consists of persons or entities that provide

LESS INTRUSIVE FLASHLIGHT APP



Reviews



Super-Bright LED Flashlight Surpax Technology Inc.

Free

🛠 Camera

take pictures and videos


? Other

- · receive data from Internet
- control flashlight
- · change system display settings
- modify system settings
- prevent device from sleeping
- view network connections
- full network access

PURELY MOBILE: ZERO PERMISSIONS MALICIOUS APP


Gyroscope


- Variety of sensors
 - Gyroscope, accelerometer, compass, microphone, cameras
 - Many do not require permissions
- Requesting GPS/Location can be viewed as suspicious
- Can we infer?
 - Gender? Age? Health information?
 - Work location, home? Identity? Social circle?
- Since 2014, we demonstrated a variety of attacks
- Illustrated in two attacks Zero Permissions
 - High accuracy keylogging [Narain et al. 2014]
 - Location Tracking [Narain et al. 2016]



INFERRING LOCATION INFORMATION WITHOUT PERMISSIONS

- Goal is not to build an Inertial Navigation System
 - Gyroscope is fairly accurate
 - Accelerometers and compass are noisy






- Collect sequence of turns
- Infer most likely trajectory


INFERRING LOCATION INFORMATION


- Open Street Maps data => build a directed graph
 - Enhance with road signature (curvature, compass headings, speed limit, potholes)



TECHNIQUES AND EVALUATION


- Developed several techniques
 - Processing data (compensating gyroscope bias, eliminating idle time)
 - Maximum likelihood path incorporating gyroscope & compass, curvature, speed limit with simple assumption on turns distribution
- Evaluation
 - Simulation on 11 cities: prob > 50% path in top 10
 - Real experiments in Boston [140 paths, 1000Km]
 - Boston (30%) and Waltham (60%) single attempt
 - Better results for longer lists, longer paths





KEYLOGGING

- Gyroscopes
 - Sensitive to motion but not very noisy
 - Similar pattern for same keys and different for other keys on x/y axes
 - Does not work well for all keys, experiences drift, etc.



- Stereo-Microphones unique delay & amplitudes e.g., HTC One
 - Distance between microphones: 0.134 m
 - Maximum supported sampling rate: 48 KHz
 - Speed of sound in air: 340 m / s
 - Difference of + 19 samples to 19 samples
- For future devices with higher sampling rate
 - Example sampling rate: 192 KHz
 - Difference of 2* 75 samples for tap close to one microphone

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EVALUATION (META-ALGORITHM)

- Meta-Algorithm
 - Combines several signal processing & machine learning techniques
 - Decompose keyboard
- Possible to guess keys (qwerty)
 - > 60% using gyroscope
 - > 90% using microphone
- Possible to achieve > 95% for Number keyboard

EVALUATION OF KEYLOGGING (END-TO-END ATTACK)

- Collected on banking app with fake numbers
 - Every UI page is known as an activity
 - Trojan queries for the foreground activity every 5s waiting for target app
- 100 four digit PIN numbers
 - 376 out of 400 digits predicted correct (94%)
 - 84 predicted completely correct
- 100 sixteen digits Credit Card numbers
 - 1467 out of 1600 digit predicted correct (91.5%)
 - 52 predicted completely correct





Total	Correct	Correct Digits	Accuracy
PINs			
100	84	376	94%
	C	redit Cards	
100	52	1467	91.5%

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EXPLOITATION

- Access to sensors is either permissionless or easily obtainable
- For using microphone convincing a user to install an App with microphone permission
- Exploiting a vulnerability in a popular App





LILY HAY NEWMAN SECURITY 05.14.19 12:05 PM

HOW HACKERS BROKE WHATSAPP WITH JUST A PHONE CALL

COVERT CHANNELS FOR DATA EXFILTRATION

- Consider two mobile apps
 - App 1: Trusted with sensitive information but no communication, e.g., password manager, journal
 - App 2: Not given access to sensitive information but has access to the network, e.g., game
- Existence of stealthy cover channels [Block et al. 2018]
 - Source: permissionless speaker (ultrasonic signals)
 - Receiver: permissionless accelerometer
- Channel characteristics
 - Multiple bands unique to device
 - Axis are independent enabling MIMO
- Source gets the received data and can CODE/retransmit if necessary






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IS THE TRADITIONAL SECURITY CYCLE ADEQUATE?

 We are increasingly reliant on wireless and mobile devices

Is this control system stable?



INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS THEORY

- Misconceptions in wireless systems
- Shannon's separation theorem is only for point-to-point communications
 - Not valid for multi-user systems (e.g., massive M2M/IoT)
 - Many open questions in network information theory
- Spread spectrum is not the best technique to counter interference in the wideband regime
 - Impulsive-FSK is!

SECURING WIRELESS AND MOBILE SYSTEMS

- Systematic approach to modeling security threats and defenses
- Security by design considering software-enabled attacks
- Securing timing and localization
- Elastic Networks provide seamless adaptivity
- As the adversary increases effort performance only reduced proportionally to adversaries effort
 - Worst case requires local decision
- No amplification effect across the stack


ELASTIC NETWORKS

- Develop and analyze elastic communication techniques
 - Theoretical foundations (algorithms, analysis, architecture)
 - Experimental evaluation
- Techniques for Elasticity
 - Physical/Link
 - Multi-carrier/antenna, super-position coding
 - Enabling techniques: keyless spread-spectrum, Impulsive-FSK, stealthy rates, game theory
 - Routing
 - Back-pressure routing for elastic radios, QoS support, heterogenous links
 - Transport
 - Network-coded MultiPath TCP transparent to applications
 - Application
 - Traffic prioritization, adaptive bitrate streaming for multimedia traffic (DASH)

ILLUSTRATIONS OF ELASTIC NETWORKS





- Agility through flexible carriers use
- Easticity through noise rejection/carriers independence
- Better than OFDM: spectral efficiency & potential for robustness



- Smart antenna systems for anti-jamming, localization
- Stealthy rates to prevent smart cross-layer att
- Mitigates an attacker with over 5 orders of ma more power


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




MATRIX: SYSTEMATIC AUDITING & SANDBOXING OF MOBILE APPS

- Auditing: *Privoscope* keeps track and visualizes apps access to services and sensors
- MATRIX: seamless full control on what Apps access [Narain 2019]
 - Sandboxing and Synthetic location/sensors generation
 - Creates a synthetic identity
 - Home, work, kids schools, favorite restaurants
 - Generates and feeds synthetic data to apps: location, sensors
 - Trajectories are randomized and indistinguishable from real
 - Evaluated through ML, and user studies





CONCLUSIONS

- Vulnerabilities derive from intrinsic constraints and design choices
 - Softwarization of hardware
 - Pervasiveness
 - Resources constraints
 - Lack of systematic approaches to modeling security in wireless & mobile systems
- We only experienced the tip of the iceberg
 - Sophisticated adversaries can perform significantly more powerful attacks
 - IoT is taking the potential of attacks to a new level
 - Little understanding of what is ahead of us
- Attribution will get even harder
 - Remote exploitation of programmable wireless chips
 - Privacy infrastructure: Tor Onion Services
 - Monetization: cryptocurrencies

QUESTIONS

- Can the security issues related to wireless softwarization be addressed through the attack-and-fix cycle?
 - CPS, DSA (5G), IoT require more vigilance
- Can theory play a bigger role in making wireless communications robust?
 - Softwarization enables more advanced techniques
 - 5G flexibility provides opportunity for increased security, privacy, and robustness

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Research in collaboration with colleagues faculty and students

K. Block, A. Cassola, A. Chan, K. Chowdhury, M. Hollick, E. Kirda, S. Narain, H. Nguyen, R. Rajaraman, A. Ranganathan, A. Sanatinia, H. Sathaye, R. Sundaram, T. Vo-Huu, T. Vo-Huu, W. Robertson, M. Salehi, D. Starobinski, M. Stute, L. Xin

Link to papers: http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/noubir

