

# Secure Cloud Assisted Smart Cars

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# Cyber Security Landscape

## Objectives

POLICY

ATTACKS

Enable  
↕  
Enforce

What?

Why?

Respond  
↕  
Defend

## Mechanisms

P  
R  
O  
T  
E  
C  
T


How?

D  
E  
T  
E  
C  
T




Complement

Reference : [www.profsandhu.com](http://www.profsandhu.com)



# Cyber Security Landscape




Reference : [www.profsandhu.com](http://www.profsandhu.com)




# Smart Cars Ecosystem

Safety and Assistance




Information and Entertainment

High Mobility, Location Centric  
Time Sensitive, Dynamic Pairing  
Multiple Fog/Cloud Infrastructures



# No More Isolated.!


100 million lines of code



Software Reliance , Broad Attack Surface, Untrusted Entities

# The Perfect World.!


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I **TRUST** my users.  
Everything is Secure. !!

Confidentiality  
Integrity  
Availability


# Access Control Mechanisms



A user [U] is allowed to perform an operation [OP] on an object [OB] if security policy [P] is satisfied.

# Access Control Mechanisms

## PROTECTION



Post Authentication

Complements other mechanisms


A user [U] is allowed to perform an operation [OP] on an object [OB] if security policy [P] is satisfied.




# Attribute Based Access Control

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
- Three Dominant Models: DAC, MAC and RBAC.
  - ABAC: Decision based on the attributes of entities
  - Attributes are name value pair: age (Alice) → 29
  - Core entities in ABAC include:
    - ❖ Users
    - ❖ Objects
    - ❖ Environment or Context
    - ❖ Operations
- } Attributes
- Authorization Policies: determine rights just in time
    - ❖ retrieve attributes of relevant entities in request
  - Enhance flexibility and fine grained access control
  - NIST Guidelines to ABAC



# Extended Access Control Oriented Architecture




E-ACO architecture



Vehicular IoT components in architecture




# Attributes and Alerts



Vehicle moves and are assigned to different groups and inherits their attributes/alerts.

# Using Location Groups



Speed Limit: 50 mph  
Deer Threat: ON  
Ice on Road: NO

Speed Limit: 30 mph  
Flood Warning: ON  
Road Work: ON

## Administrative Questions:


- How the attributes or alerts of groups are updated?
- How are moving entities assigned to groups?
- How groups hierarchy is created?

## Operational Questions:


- How attributes and groups are used to provide security?
- How user privacy preferences are considered?

```
{"state": {"reported": {"Latitude": "29.4769353",  
"Longitude": "-98.5018237"}}}
```


Reported MQTT message




# CV-ABAC<sub>G</sub> Model



- > One to Many
- ←----- Attribute / Policy Association
- ←-----> Many to Many
- ←-----> Many to Many Dynamic Group Association
- Zero or More
- > One to Many Association




# Model Components




{ location, size, IP, direction, speed,  
VIN, cuisine-type}



# Model Components




{ read, write, control, notify, administrative actions }



# Model Components

Cars, traffic lights, smart-devices

Sensor, ECU, on-board apps




Location groups, service-specific, vehicle-type






# Model Components

Operational and Administrative Activities  
{notification, alerts, group hierarchy updates}



System Wide Policies

Individualized Privacy Policies




# Formal Specification

## Basic Sets and Functions

- S, CO, O, G, OP are finite sets of sources, clustered objects, objects, groups and operations respectively [blue circles in Figure 4].
- A is a finite set of activities which can be performed in system.
- ATT is a finite set of attributes associated with S, CO, O, G and system-wide. **Attribute Function**
- For each attribute att in ATT, Range(att) is a finite set of atomic values.
- attType: ATT = {set, atomic}, defines attributes to be set or atomic valued. **Attribute Type**
- Each attribute att in ATT maps entities in S, CO, O, G to attribute values. Formally,  
$$\text{att} : S \cup CO \cup O \cup G \cup \{\text{system-wide}\} \rightarrow \begin{cases} \text{Range}(\text{att}) \cup \{\perp\} & \text{if attType}(\text{att}) = \text{atomic} \\ 2^{\text{Range}(\text{att})} & \text{if attType}(\text{att}) = \text{set} \end{cases}$$
- POL is a finite set of authorization policies associated with individual S, CO, O, G.
- directG : CO → G, mapping each clustered object to a system group, equivalently CGA ⊆ CO × G.
- parentCO : O → CO, mapping each object to a clustered object, equivalently OCA ⊆ O × CO.
- GH ⊆ G × G, a partial order relation ≥<sub>g</sub> on G. Equivalently, parentG : G → 2<sup>G</sup>, mapping group to a set of parent groups in hierarchy.

**Group Hierarchy**

**Attribute Mapping**



# Formal Specification

## Effective Attributes of Groups, Clustered Objects and Objects (Derived Functions)

– For each attribute  $att$  in  $ATT$  such that  $attType(att) = set$ :


- $effG_{att} : G \rightarrow 2^{Range(att)}$ , defined as  $effG_{att}(g_i) = att(g_i) \cup \left( \bigcup_{g \in \{g_j | g_i \succeq_g g_j\}} effG_{att}(g) \right)$ .
- $effCO_{att} : CO \rightarrow 2^{Range(att)}$ , defined as  $effCO_{att}(co) = att(co) \cup effG_{att}(directG(co))$ .
- $effO_{att} : O \rightarrow 2^{Range(att)}$ , defined as  $effO_{att}(o) = att(o) \cup effCO_{att}(parentCO(o))$ .

– For each attribute  $att$  in  $ATT$  such that  $attType(att) = atomic$ :

- $effG_{att} : G \rightarrow Range(att) \cup \{\perp\}$ , defined as  $effG_{att}(g_i) = \begin{cases} att(g_i) & \text{if } \forall g' \in parentG(g_i). effG_{att}(g') = \perp \\ effG_{att}(g') & \text{if } \exists parentG(g_i). effG_{att}(parentG(g_i)) \neq \perp \text{ then select} \\ & \text{parent } g' \text{ with } effG_{att}(g') \neq \perp \text{ updated most recently.} \end{cases}$
- $effCO_{att} : CO \rightarrow Range(att) \cup \{\perp\}$ , defined as  $effCO_{att}(co) = \begin{cases} att(co) & \text{if } effG_{att}(directG(co)) = \perp \\ effG_{att}(directG(co)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
- $effO_{att} : O \rightarrow Range(att) \cup \{\perp\}$ , defined as  $effO_{att}(o) = \begin{cases} att(o) & \text{if } effCO_{att}(parentCO(o)) = \perp \\ effCO_{att}(parentCO(o)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Attributes more Dynamic

Attributes Inheritance



# Policy Language

## Authorization Functions (Policies)

– Authorization Function: For each  $op \in OP$ ,  $Auth_{op}(s : S, ob : CO \cup O \cup G)$  is a propositional logic formula returning true or false, which is defined using the following policy language:

- $\alpha ::= \alpha \wedge \alpha \mid \alpha \vee \alpha \mid (\alpha) \mid \neg \alpha \mid \exists x \in \text{set}.\alpha \mid \forall x \in \text{set}.\alpha \mid \text{set} \Delta \text{set} \mid \text{atomic} \in \text{set} \mid \text{atomic} \notin \text{set}$
- $\Delta ::= \subset \mid \subseteq \mid \not\subseteq \mid \cap \mid \cup$
- $\text{set} ::= \text{eff}_{\text{att}}(i) \mid \text{att}(i)$  for  $\text{att} \in ATT, i \in S \cup CO \cup O \cup G \cup \{\text{system-wide}\}, \text{attType}(\text{att}) = \text{set}$
- $\text{atomic} ::= \text{eff}_{\text{att}}(i) \mid \text{att}(i) \mid \text{value}$  for  $\text{att} \in ATT, i \in S \cup CO \cup O \cup G \cup \{\text{system-wide}\}, \text{attType}(\text{att}) = \text{atomic}$

❖ Administrators in the police department can send alert to location-groups in city limits.

$Auth_{\text{alert}}(u:U, g:G) ::= \text{dept}(u) = \text{Police} \wedge \text{parent-city}(g) = \text{Austin} \wedge$   
 $\text{Austin} \in \text{jursidiction}(u).$

❖ Only mechanic in the technician department from Toyota-X dealership must be able to read sensor in Camry LE. Further, this operation must be done between time 9 am to 6 pm.

$Auth_{\text{read}}(u:U, co:CO) ::= \text{role}(u) = \text{Technician} \wedge \text{employer}(u) = \text{Toyota-X} \wedge$   
 $\text{make}(co) = \text{Toyota} \wedge \text{model}(co) = \text{Camry LE} \wedge$   
 $\text{operation\_time}(u) \in \{9\text{am}, 10, 11 \dots 6\text{pm}\}$



# Activity Authorization Decision

## Authorization Decision

– A source  $s \in S$  is allowed to perform an activity  $a \in A$ , stated as  $\text{Authorization}(a : A, s : S)$ , if the required policies needed to allow the activity are included and evaluated to make final decision. These multi-layer policies must be evaluated for individual operations ( $op_i \in OP$ ) to be performed by source  $s \in S$  on relevant objects ( $x_i \in CO \cup O \cup G$ )

Formally,  $\text{Authorization}(a : A, s : S) \Rightarrow \text{Auth}_{op_1}(s : S, x_1), \text{Auth}_{op_2}(s : S, x_2), \dots, \text{Auth}_{op_n}(s : S, x_n)$

Evaluate all relevant policies to make a decision


A restaurant in group A must be allowed to send notifications to all vehicles in location group A and group B.

I only want notifications from Cheesecake factory.

System defined

DECISION

User Preference




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# Implementation in Amazon Web Services (AWS)



# Vehicles and Groups



4 Location Groups  
(static demarcation)

Vehicles movement  
(coordinates generated  
using Google API)

```
('Received new coordinates from:', 'Vehicle-1')  
Sun May 27 02:56:30 2018
```

```
Location A
```

```
Car-A : [u'Vehicle-1', u'Vehicle-2']
```

```
Bus-A : []
```

```
Location B
```

```
Car-B : []
```

```
Bus-B : [u'Vehicle-6']
```

```
Location C
```

```
Car-C : [u'Vehicle-3', u'Vehicle-4']
```

```
Bus-C : []
```

```
Location D
```

```
Car-D : []
```



```
Bus-D : [u'Vehicle-5']
```

Snapshot (table keeps changing)




# AWS Architecture

## AWS Cloud Components







# Performance Metrics



# Performance Metrics



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# Let's Talk ..!!

Questions, Comments or Concerns

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